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Robert Galavan and john Cullen 
C d · 1 term strategic planning in a fluid and uncertain world· on ucting ong- . . . . . , 
llin mz. ati·ons while attemptmg to remain flextble, stewarding em-contro g orga . . . . , . . 
ployees through processes of change whilst ~~Intatrung on~ s. cre~hility; 
motivating whilst keeping an eye on profitability; and remammg rumble-
minded while crafting innovative futures. The demands of leadership are 
simultaneously delightful and daunting, which is probably why more books, 
research theses, and articles are published on the subject than any other aspect 
of business or management. 
However insurmountable the challenges of leadership may appear, many 
senior managers meet the demands and some even manage to do so with style! 
Others, no matter how hard they try, regardless of their brilliance or past 
achievements, fail. Why is this? A scan of the business sections of the popular 
press would doubtlessly provide the 'correlation, oriented student with enough 
data to apparently answer this question. Successful businesses, it would seem, 
rise to their lofty heights because of the efforts of talented management teams. 
Despite the difficulties of emerging technologies and the vagaries of the 
markets, .these select groups have managed to step with grace through the 
war-to~n Industry. and emerge with the spoils. On the other hand, organizations 
that fail. to remam competitive are often the victims of failures within the 
market m which they operate and not because of a lack of management talent. 
A student of human behavior will quickly recognize this relationship be-
tween success and leadership d .c. ·1 · f · g .b . . ' an 1ai ure and Circumstances as a sel -servm 
attn utton. That Is we ash h . ' d hin ' umans ave an mnate tendency to believe goo 
t ~ds hapfpen because of our actions and bad things happen because of factors 
outsi e o our control "t b li h . 
th f · 
0 e eve ot erwise would be to accept that we were 
e cause o our own probl B . h 
business press is self-ser . ems. ut even ~fwhat we observe in the pages oft e 
managers create succes:~g,t w~ cannot stmply dismiss it. Could it be true tha~ 
agement issues, the resp~ns~ ~~c~mstanc~s cause failure? As with most rna~t 
is the market in some c h le sometunes and it depends. In some cases 
· ases t e eade · d even r, m some the organization, an 
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occasionally the gov_ernmen~! ~he important thing for us to kn . 
causes leaders or thetr orga~atlons· environments to be more o ow ~s what 
n·al Central to our explanatton of this is an unde t din fr less mfluen-. il bl 1 · rs an g 0 the 1 1 discretion ava a e to eaders m any given situation. eve of 
It is broa.dly accepted th~t, to some extent, leaders matter to the p r£ 
ance of thetr firms. The Widely publicized pay rates of seru'or .e orm-
f 1 hal h executtves the growth o a g o searc and headhunt industrv and the tt u· 'd b' . . ~,, a en on pat y the 
contemporary orgaruzatton to talent development are surface indicat f 
these beliefs, underscoring a deeply, often tacitly held conviction that orslio 
d h
. . . 1 qua ty oflea ers tp 1s tnstru~en~a to sustainable growth. Of course, while this is the 
generally accepted v1ew 1n contemporary management circles it could b 
argued that it would seem less than beneficial for leaders to mak~ any alterna~ 
rive claim. On the other hand researchers, unencumbered by the limitations of 
their practitioner subjects, have a well-established (even if not well read by 
management practitioners) school of thought that argues to the contrary. It 
articulates that managers really don·t matter very much. Proponents of this 
view, who are broadly categorized as population ecologists, take a somewhat 
Darwinian perspective, explaining corporate performance as a function of fit 
between the organization and its environment.1 Organizations are, from this 
perspective, too large, slow, cumbersome, political, and socially embedded for 
mere leaders to influence them much and so, if organizations find that they are 
a poor fit for their changing markets, they simply die out and are replaced ~y a 
better-fitted species. The only solution available to man~gers ~nd to or~a: 
tions in this scenario is to engage in regular cycles of creanve destructto~, 
where the entire organization is radically redesigned fr~m top to ?ott~m Wlth 
the aim of continually readjusting itself to meet raptdly changmg ~dustry 
environments and customer needs.2 This view, of course, is closely al~gned to 
the perspective that all organizations, over their lifespan, are engaged m cycles 
f . . . eli db sigm'ficant challenge or o qwet evolutionary penods which are srupte . Y a . chan e 3 
leadership crisis which demands a short, sharp penod of revolunlondary g ·d 
11 d t and that ea ers can an The counter-claim is that managers rea Y 0 mater . 11 afliect their d · · and so matena Y 
o change the course of their orgaruzattons d differences that change the 
performance and in some cases make profoun . h most intractable of 
industry. In this counter-clai~, even leaders :~c:g ~a~e a difference. Take, 
Problems such as crime on c1ty streets can .a db h press as having cleaned 
for example, Rudi Giuliani who is widely credi~e 'f ~~ :enuous powers of~ city 
up the streets of New York in the 1990s. Sure! 1 d complex organization 
tn . 1 1 d the diverse an ayor can be enacted to effecuve Y ea t But this would be to 
of . h 1 ders must mater. . 
ctty bureaucrats and police, t en ea . d in the city organizatton 
Presume that it was in fact Giuliani or m~ee any~e k At least one notable 
that managed to reduce the crime rate ~ N ~;d ~:e~hen Levitt, disagrees. 
award-winning economist, the Harvard-e uca 
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'"ersiallv offered an alternative explanation for th 
He rather controv " ffi fl a1· . e redu . 
' . . N vork in the 1990s as an e ect o eg IZmg abortion. Ctio11 of cnme m ew 1' • H . th lil theu 
. th Roe vs Wade case m 1973. e postts at rather than SA 
fo~owmG~uli e . for hls efforts we can see that 'legalized abortion 1 cdongratu. 
latmg t am d hi h . 1 aliz e to I 
unwantedness; unwantedness lea s to g cnme; eg ed abortion, ess 
fore, led to less crime.'4 In other words the teenage~s of_the 1990s who !ere. 
h b me criminals were simply never born. While this explanation &ht 
~ve dec~s morally outrageous, if it has even a semblance of truthtnayhbe 
Vtewe . . 1 1 d ' t en Giuliani's success in the war on cnm~ ts al t ehast paulrt y f u~ to a change in his 
organization's environment and no~ st~p yht : rhes 
1
t o his leadership. Taken 
in the extreme, he ~ot ~ucky by bemg m t e ng t p ace at the right time and 
took credit for the mevttable. 
The risk in following the course ?f ~s _argument is that we get caught in the 
rather academic and black and white divtde of whether managers do or don't 
matter. A more pragmatic course is to perhaps try to understand the circum-
stances in which lea~ers have a greater or lesser effect. Phrased slighrly 
differently, we are trymg to understand the extent of the constraints on a 
leader's discretion. Broadly speaking, these constraints come in at least two 
forms:5 the operating environment and the organization itself. 
Let us consider in the first instance the operating environment which, for 
commercial organizations, can usually be described by the concept of its industry. 
In some cases, the industry will confer more discretion on a leader than in others. 
Take for example the differences between the software industry and the forestry 
industry. If we consider just three factors that affect the discretion afforded to 
these industries, product commoditization, demand stability, and capital inten-
sity, we can easily identify the software industry as a high-discretion industry and 
forestry as a low-discretion industry (see Table 13.1). The net effect is that 
managers in the software industry have a greater latitude of action and so firm 
performance ~ the software industry is relatively more affected by m~agers and 
less so by the mdustry conditions. In the case of the forestry industry (m Ireland) 
manag~rs can do relatively little about the market price of logs and so ~ 
co~~amed in their actions. On this basis forestry managers are prisoners 0 
thetr mdustry whil ftw ' e so are managers roam free. 
TABLE 13 .1 Discretion in different industries 
Software Forestry 
Product commoditization Low High 
Demand stability Low High 
Capital intensity 
Low High 
Overall discretion High Low 
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nd form of constraint on a manager's di . . 
'fhe sec~ organizations with limited slack resou:~:euo~ ls the organization 
itsel£ L.argtheir leader's discretion. We can see the effis an fphowerful cultures 
pstratO · h · t · d ect 0 ow culture con co . discretion tn t e pnn tn ustry. Over the past tw d d -
.-110S c. · · h h 0 eca es the market 
SLl"...-th technology tOr pnntmg as c anged enormously. M . . 
d e di · · h rli~,, · any orgaruzattons 
all craft tra uons Wit powe w and long-standin . 
built on 1 h g uruon agreements 
understandably s ow to c ange. As the markets tightened th . 1 k were ell d ak · th · . , e1r s ac 
ources dwin e ' m mg etr operating circumstances even more difficult 
~: them. Many of the firm~ that pr~~pered in this phase were new start-ups, 
Cumbered by sunk capttal, tradittons, and powerful cultures Th unen . . h . . ese new 
.. .-.i-rations, operattng m t e same mdustry, provided the oppo tu ·t· 
orgcuU£' b ild bil' . h r ru 1es 
, their founders to u capa 1t1es t at met the emerging market need 
!Of di . b d d S, 
leaving their tr.a tton~en~u~ .ere pre ecessors imprisoned by their organ-
izations' histones. This tnabihty of an organization to change even when 
alarm bells are ringing loudly that the market is changing has been described 
as 'culturallock-in'
6 
and is a powerful example that often 'strong' cultures 
which are allowed to develop, or even are purposefully created, in organiza-
tions can eventually become pathological to an organization's own well-being, 
competitiveness, and sustainability. 
Knowing whether an industry, an organization, or both give or constrain a 
leader's discretion should help us understand the circumstances in which 
managers matter most, and indeed, the research would seem to bear this 
out.7 On average managers in high-discretion contexts matter more than 
those in low-discretion contexts. But 'on average' isn't much use when we 
need to consider a specific case. No organization has an average leader. They 
have real people who lead individual lives and while some industries undoubt-
edly have inherent constraints sometimes the constraints are more in the 
~ds of the industry leaders. A lucid example is that of the airline ind~st~ 
w~ch, in a few years in the 1980s, lost more money than it had made m tts 
enttre history. It almost repeated this remarkable feat in the aftermath of the 
11 September attacks. Its lack of fluid resources, capital intensity, and, apart 
&om infrequent shocks demand stability provided all of the characteristics of a 
low-di · ' bli h d d all or .scr~tlon industry. The rules of the game were ':ell ~sta s . e . an . 
ganizattons followed a similar patter of competition Wlth little vanatton. T~s 
;as llntil Herb Kelleher brought low-cost carriers to the fore ~ Ameri~a Wlth 
s~~thwest Airlines, followed in Europe by Michael O'Leary s Ryanat_r, an.d 
ind sequently Stelios Haji-Ioannou's easy jet. Their subsequent success m. this 
abl~s~ is Well documented. So how were they able to take on the constd~r­
th lllight of the airline industry and win? Well, one of the reas~ns was t ~t 
ese new b d b th constramts of thetr 
org::~n~- operators were clearly unencum ere Y e th di . t 
--~atio T . · d had e scretton o 
establish ns. hey developed new orgaruzanons an d Therr· 
~;o- . d ds an processes. I.Ulrerent cultures, policies, routmes, stan ar ' 
245 
~~~eO~~ . 
. businesses, were constramed by 
dd d · the full servtce counterparts, embe e tn . d ls capital structures, pay agreements, 
1 · hi bustness mo e , f · · h contracts, re anons P~· . ed this. The reaction o some was ms1g t-
and more; and they qutckly reco~ . ch as Buzz and Go that would be , , · a1 orgamzanons su . 
ful and they set up new nv di . and have the discretton to take on 
b h · · ting con nons unencumbered Y t err eXls h b uent success or more to the point 
the pretenders to their thro~e. ~ e :~ e s~~ll well documented. Why though, 
lack of success of these orgaruzatlons . q. y were lifted could these fledgling 
if the constraints of the existing organtzatlons ' 
offspring not survive? . d b h third type of discretion con-
h artly be explame Y t e T e reasons can ph 1 While the offshoots of the major airlines 
straint the leaders t emse ves. h h h 1 k 
benefi~ed from the organizational discretion ~fforde.d to t em t :ou~ a ac. 
of established assets, processes, and routines m thetr new o~gamzatlon, then 
· · e experienced airline people and, while they had the seruor executives wer . . 
potential to benefit from this discretion, perhaps they were unab~e .to perce1ve 
and act on it. On the other hand the leaders of the new low-cost arrlmes had no 
such experiential constraints; before entering the airli~e indus:ry Kelleher was 
a practicing lawyer, O'Leary an accountant, and Stehos a senal entrepreneur. 
Rather than being imprisoned by their knowledge of the industry and the rules 
they couldn't break, they used their innovative capabilities to the full to find 
new ways of building the most profitable airlines of the twenty-first century. By 
not being part of the culture of the industry in which they found themselves 
leaders, they were enabled to think outside the established cultural paradigms 
of the sector. If we articulate culture as simply the subconscious acceptance of 
'the v:ay things are done around here,' and these new industry leaders were not 
of this culture, we can see they had a greater level of conscious awareness of the 
way things. are not done around here, which equipped them with a sensitivity to 
the potenual pathologies of the industry they faced at that point in time. 
So we can clearly identify that the nature of the industry matters and the 
nature of the organizatio I h · hi hl di . n matters. n ot er words some leaders operate m 
1 g yf hsc~eti~nary external and organizational settings and some find regard-ess o t e1r euorts that h · , 
take it that it is ab;olutel c ange ?roves next to impossible. From this we can 
available to them m· · y ess~ntla~ for leaders to assess the level of discretion 
a g1ven Sltuatlon Fail d . 
formance by not forging ahe d . h ure to o so will lead to underpe:-
available, or wasting energy t;. Wlt ~nough ~sto when the discretion lS 
This assessment of course assu~g t~ c ~nge things when it is not. 
reality they face. First we must es k, at ~~ers have the capability to assess the 
whether it is possible to even kn as h Wlt out becoming too philosophical, 
assets where the balance sheet o~~ :at the reality is. In a world of intangible 
than 50 per cent of their share val e~ ng organizations often accounts for leSS 
are available to him or her and un~;;st o: c: a leader 'know' the resources th~t 
an t e nature of the industry? Even if it 1S 
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'ble to know this reality, do managers have the time and could th h dl 
P0sst . 1 d'? B . . d h ey an e the complexity lnvo ve . ear m nun t at we are now well embedded in an 
·~f. ....,arion-saturated world where we are bombarded with views anal · d 
11pOliA~ h ak . . "bl , ys1s, an data at a rate t at m es lt 1mposs1 e to filter and sift through the continually 
rphing streams of data that we are presented with in what has been call d th rno ,s L d lik all e e 
, ttention economy. ea ers, e of us, need to limit the amount of 
~orrnatio~ that they c~ P.rocess, ~d this creates what is known as bounded 
rationality. To cope w1th informatlon overload, leaders develop internalized 
approximations of the world they ope~ate in; a~proximations which might be 
thought of as perso~al maps of the busmess reality that they must grapple with 
on a day-to-day baslS. 
These maps are developed over time as leaders gain experience, posit theories 
of the world they operate in, and test these theories in practice. Of course when 
testing our theories we have a tendency to look for only the supporting informa-
tion and discard the rest, thus exposing the possibility of developing inaccurate, 
but trusted maps. Thus when two leaders face the same 'reality' (environmental 
and organization discretion) they will interpret this reality differently. They will 
overlay the complexity of the 'real' situation which they face with their own 
simplified version of reality in the form of their experientially developed idiosyn-
cratic maps. In this way each leader sees their future options through the lens of 
past experiences. This allows them to learn from the lessons of the past, but at 
the same time imprisons their minds within the limits of the map. When leaders 
operate in circumstances where the future is by and large a replica of their 
past, those with experience and well-developed maps are likely to flourish. The 
uninitiated and the naive will have to expend their energy learning costly 'new' 
lessons. However in circumstances where the future will most likely involve 
significant change to meet a desired outcome perhaps both in the industry and 
the organization, these experienced leaders may find themselves disadvantaged. 
In such situations, the old-timers' demonstrative stories ofpastfailuresintended to 
?elpfully teach the inexperienced the lessons of experience are often interpreted as 
holding on to the past' when perhaps new mindsets or maps are needed. 
In addition to the embeddedness of thought that these maps create, they 
create other issues as well. The maps are, by their very nature, deeply personal. 
Our individual psychological make-up is contributed to by forces and experi-
~nces that are not necessarily of our choosing, but w~ch e~ert ph~nomenal 
influence over how we experience reality and the world m which we live. Often 
these experiences are painful or traumatic and our world-view or personal 
Paradigm develops to help us subconsciously protect ourselves. In particular we 
are drawn to states of mind and being that reduce pain and tension for us. We 
can. become aware of our world-view if somebody asks us to 'see things from 
thetr point of view' or 'take a different' perspective. What they are asking us to 
consider is an alternative map. However, because these maps are so personal, 
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and function to protect us from reliving difficult and traumatic experiences in 
the future, we tend to treat any threat to them ~s a personal threat and lapse 
into defensive mode. In this mode we try to convmce the othe_r person that our 
map is the 'right' one. They then take this as an assault on th~rr own _map and a 
dysfunctional cycle of arguing about maps_ rather than explonng reality, ensu~s. 
To make progress in situations that requrre change, and to fully engage With 
that change, leaders need to be able to engage in a constructive dialogue that 
stretches and extends the boundaries of their knowledge and the knowledge of 
others with whom they interact. 
This process is problematic for everyone who attempts it; behavioral scien-
tists assert that our core need as human beings is for self-protection. Managers 
and executives working in organizations in developed economies probably face 
their cognitive map violation on a much more regular basis than perhaps any 
other occupation. The reason for this is that they are continually, even relent-
lessly involved at the coalface of determining what an organization's reality is. 
In the early 1970s, Henry Mintzberg1 0 overturned much of the accepted 
management theory on how managers actually spend their time, by positing 
that the vast majority of managerial time is spent in interpersonal communi-
cation. If Mintzberg's findings are generalizable to the broader population of 
~a~agers, th_ey .must f~c~ challenges from all quarters as to what their organ-
tzatlOnal re~lity Is, h?w ,lt 1s changing, and how future challenges should be met. 
~ey. to the co-creation of organizational realities with all stakeholders (organ-
tza~lOnal actors, shareholders, customers, etc.) is the ability to do something 
~hich very often only highly trained counsellors, psychotherapists, and psy-
~h~a:lysts do; to ent~r the mindset of the individual or groups with whom 
Y alogue. Influential psychologists from the 1960s human potential move-
ment, such as Carl Rogers and Ab h M 1 f 
developing , a f r . , ra am as ow, stressed the importance o 
t d
e IV~ Iste~g skills as crucial tools to help overcome conflicts and 
o create con UCive workmg a d li . . 
this is not a unive 1 . n vtng environments. It must be stipulated that 
short-term challe~~~sr~quiren;-ent though, and extended dialogue in the face of 
by-analysis' at times w~enodit .a w~ys a. great idea. In fact it can lead to 'paralysis-
. n rectton Is most n d d S . ds 
to tmpose their vision or m d . ee e · omet1mes a leader nee 
o~erates to, and this is part~~u~~l ~~ke 1t the reality that the organization 
picture of what they should d I h Y b e case when employees need a clear 
increasing and that globaliz ot.. t ~s become a cliche that the pace of change is 
di . a Ion Is eginnin · a1 srupt10n. Crises are often ca d b g to cause market and soCiet 
tu d · · use Y the em re sttuauons. During these t" ergence of unfamiliar, unstruc-
that it is a crisis, providing a c1 lffies,da leader proves their worth by recognizing 
or is happening, and moves w~~r an 1 structured analysis of what has happened 
to address the challenge whi h hreso ve to implement a solution or a structure 
c as emerged. 
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bing a conclusion that while the industry and organizational 
we are reac r so too does the leader's perception of these realities; and 
conte~ts ~a~~ ieader's perception of their discretion. There are several defini-
parricular ~ ~management actually is, but when we consider what it is that senior 
tiOlls of VI ~ally do, the following one is helpful: manap;ing is 'the creation and 
managers a of practical meaning in organised activity.'1 This definition empha-
maintenanc~ that leaders play in offering a clear picture of what organizational 
siZe~ ~e r~ and the practical and purposeful reasons for why they need to create 
realines ar , ld . 'd c. th . . m~nizational wor -Vlews: to prov1 e a map tOr e orgaruzatlon to 
these oro-- . 
tively meet 1ts goals. 
eff~ of the most interesting findings of Robert Galavan' s recent research has 
n: challenge to the almost total acceptance of the 'fact' that the major 
been , d h · · f h di · ail bl influence on leaders maps, an t err percept10n .o t. e scret10.n av ~ e to 
th m is their experience. Most students of orgaruzat10nal behav10ur will have 
0~~ across the concept of selective perception 
12 
in prescribed textbooks. 
~espite the canonical status of this concept, there is however relatively little 
support13 for the original findings that managers selectively perceive issues on 
the basis of their experiences. In his research, Galavan found that in addition to 
experience the personality of the manager is at least as and perhaps more potent 
an indicator of their perceived discretion. That is, when we discount differences 
based on industry or organization, and even differences based on their personal 
work and educational experiences, we find that some managers inherently 
perceive that they have more discretion than others. The implication is that 
two t'!lanagers with the same experiences, faced with the same situation, will 
hold a different perception of the discretion available to them and consequently 
act differently. 
The implications for leaders of these findings are profound. If we need a 
~anager to lead change, not only must we take into account their experience, 
. oth P~rsonal and industry, but we must also consider the perceptions they hold 
m relatlOn to the discretion managers have more generally. It is clear from the 
research th t th . . rn h a e1r v1ews will vary widely. We can surmise that when perception 
is ~:~be:b;eality and ~anagers have an accurate understanding of their world this 
but th Y ~ go?d thing. If, however, the leader perceives they can do nothing, 
reco~~eality lS ~hat they can do much, they will miss an opportunity. But 
all th mg that discretion is available does not mean that leaders need to have 
tore~ ans;-ers. Ifleaders can create enough slack in the organization to allow it 
elllerg~~f to the environment it is possible that a learning organization might 
in fact th o~he ?the~ hand a leader perceives that they can create change when 
difficulti:s r:nd ty 18 qu1~e different then the outcome is likely to be fraught with 
'fo avoid tni frustration for ~:erybody involved. . 
no avail ~~. ssed opporturutles and the frustrat10n of expending effort to 
vve need t 'd h 0 cons1 er ow people learn about the world around them. 
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In organizational settings getting to 'know' things is a largely a social interpret-
ation process, or in Karl Weick's term 'sensemaking.'
14 
Through making sense 
of the world around us we come not to really know reality, but to move to 
agree on the premiss for reality-what has worked in the past, and what will 
work in the future. Once most of the players in the game agree on that reality 
and play by the rules then all is fine. Economists might explain the 'rules,' 
people may learn and play by them, then the market will function as expected. 
This familiar economic modeling of a market scenario, however, is very often 
different from how markets operate in the real world. These models, at a 
particular point in time, merely present a good working approximation of how 
markets operate. Failure to recognize that this is merely an approximation of 
reality, rather than reality itself, means leaders can fall into the trap of impri-
soning their minds and consciously or unconsciously blocking all other options 
that might have been available to them, options that not only challenge, but 
change the rules of the game. 
Leaders are ultimately prison inmates of one kind or another. The only 
question is whether it is a high-security or an open prison and the industry 
characteristics will often give us the answer. The difference between the 
leader's prison and the criminal's prison is that the leader's bars are sometimes 
mental constraints and not physicaL Leaders can break free of the bars by 
deciding to do just that. The key element to remember in this regard is, once 
again, discretion. Senior managers who make a real difference to the organiza-
tions that they lead are ones who actively choose to confront the limitations 
that their own world-view places upon them in an effort to transcend the bars 
that have been built for them. It is interesting to note that topics such as self-
awareness and personal development are being articulated with greater regu-
larity in the literature associated with the fields of management development 
and management learning. These processes are key to assisting leaders in 
understanding their personal maps, their values, principles, and the internal 
psychological barriers that might inhibit their personal effectiveness. 
One approach to help leaders develop their understanding can be broadly 
described as reflective practice, where leaders are urged to systematically reflect 
on their own performance, decisions, and reaction to stressful scenarios that 
may have arisen in their work. The practices associated with this family of 
approaches are broad and range from group counseling to personal journal 
keeping, but the aims are the same: to help managers gain an awareness of 
themselves, their behaviors, and their mental maps in order that they can 
recognize their limitations and address them through processes of personal 
development, and also to maximize the talents and skills that they have. 
A second approach involves managers developing a deeper understanding of 
what may have happened to them during their crucible experiences. 15 Painful 
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of failure , reputational damage, even humiliation are valued be-
a!'erienfces vived they strengthen a manager's resolve and develop a much 
i sur , bul . h cause. .lienee for the tur ent nmes a ead. Most importantly, they are 
ded rest . . h c · fr nee ·al experiences in. asststtng t e. tran.s~~rmatton . o~ manager to leader, 
essertO clearly commumcat~ leadershtp .a~~ttles b~ forcmg Individuals to stretch 
as r~er Ilectual and emotional capabihnes. Vanous leaders are eulogized in 
rhetr 10.te ss context (some even choose to lavish praise on themselves)· but it is 
he bustne h h d · · ' r . g to note that leaders w o ave rna e thetr way mto popular under-
inte~s~ of leadership are ones who themselves have been forced into posi-
s~an nr self-assessment and personal transformation through actual physical 
~00\~nment. Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Anwar Sadat 
unp~ dividuals who directly confronted their own maps for viewing their 
:~r;~ and their relationship to social reality and, despit~ the obstacles they 
f: ced, chose to reassess and transform themselves. By bemg placed in a pos-
i~on where they have effectively lost everything, including their freedom, 
leaders who emerge from the crucible experience intact have been through a 
process which has radically widened the dimensions of their personal map. The 
experience ofbeing imprisoned in a very real sense actually led these leaders to 
realize the potential they had for exercising discretion about how they would 
conduct their own public professional lives. With just a few anecdotal examples 
like this we can say clearly that leaders do matter. But it is perhaps more 
important to recognize that some leaders matter more than others and not just 
because of the circumstances they found themselves in. In the early days of 
Ryanair, a friend of one of the authors of this chapter berated him for using a 
case study based on the airline. He was told that they 'knew' the industry, as 
th.ey had worked in it, and that you couldn't fly planes at that cost. Luckily for 
O.Leary and the other low-cost carriers it appears the entire industry 'knew' 
this low cost model couldn't work, and left them to get on with it. Time has 
shown very clearly that it does work and now less than a handful of low-cost 
caiers account for most of the profits in the global airline industry. 
1 d he examples that we have discussed are supportive of the position that 
c:a ~rs who orchestrated structural change within industries often were unen-
tirn m ered by the organizational constraints their competitors faced. During 
antts ~f change, these leaders exercised the organizational and most import-
theJ ~s~;e~sonal perceived discretion available to them. Allleade~s can expand 
in Whi h etton, not through accumulating more facts about the circumstances 
althou c h ~ey find themselves nor better understanding the rules of the game, 
With l~r .oth have value. The real differences come through an engagement 
person 1 ~g at a deeper level, a level that allows the leader to reflect on the 
. 'fhe ach:ths' they hold and recognize how they are imprison~d by .them. 
CJ.rcutllst enge for leaders is to recognize and act on the discretiOn the 
ances offer and then to have the ability to reflect on that 'reality' 
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through an understanding that this is just their own idiosyncratic view shap d 
by the facts, but also their personality, beliefs, and learning experiences fr e 
the past. The first step in breaking free of the discretion prison is to realize t~lll 
you are in a prison. Having done this, the most capable leaders will have t~t 
personal strength and drive to stick with their view when appropriate, and the 
humility to learn from others when the time is right. The question for you i~ 
which kind of leader will you be? In the final analysis it matters not whether 
you believe you can make a difference or not-either way you will be right! 
Think about it-then do something about it. 
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